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Counsel for Misdemeanants Denied-Wintersv.
Beck, 87 S. Ct. 207 (1966). Defendant, an indigent
Negro, was convicted of violating a city ordinance
making "immorality" a misdemeanor. He was
sentenced to 284 days in prison when he could not
pay the fine. The Arkansas Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction, holding that Gideon v.
Wainwright did not apply to misdemeanors. A
petition for certiorariwas denied by the Supreme
Court.
Justice Stewart, in a dissenting memorandum,
pointed out that the Court in Gideon had made no
distinction between felonies and misdemeanors.
"Any person," the Court had said in Gideon,
"baled into court who is too poor to hire a lawyer,
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him." Justice Stewart, joined by
Justice Black, said that "No state should be permitted to repudiate those words by arbitrarily
attaching the label 'misdemeanor' to a criminal
offense". He also pointed out that various circuits
had made conflicting decisions on this issue and
that it was therefore appropriate to grant certiorari
to resolve the question.
Coerced Confession Found--Commonwealth ex
rel Donnell v. Myers, 220 A. 2d 376 (Pa. 1966).
Petitioner was arrested and subsequently convicted of burglary, larceny, and receiving stolen
goods. During his confinement he was questioned
several times but refused to confess to the crime.
He was then put in solitary confinement in a dark,
cold cell, handcuffed, and chained to the wall, and
fed bread and water for eleven days, after which
he finally admitted the crime. The confession was
found to be voluntary by the same jury that
convicted the defendant.
Thereafter, on a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, a second hearing was held to determine
whether the confession was in fact voluntary and a
second jury found that it was.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed,
applying the test expressed in Reck v. Pate, 367

U.S. 433, (1961), that is, "whether a person's will
is so overborne at the time he confessed... [that]
...the confession can not be deemed the product
of a rational intellect and free will." In this case
the court felt that the confinement of the accused
was for such a period of time and was under such
cruel and inhuman conditions that it would be
sufficient to destroy the will power of almost any
person.
Intent In Common Law Robbery-State v.
Smith, 150 S.E. 2d 194 (N.C. 1966). Defendant
was tried and convicted upon two indictments.
The first charged him with assault with a deadly
weapon upon R. W. Spikes, a police officer; the
second with armed robbery of a rifle from H. H.
Adams.
The defendant and his partner, one Thomas
Henry, had broken into a service station owned by
Adams. Adams heard the breaking of glass, and
came out of his bedroom with a rifle. He came upon
Henry, who told him "that someone had his car
and wouldn't give it back to him." At that time
Adams saw a police car across the street, and approached it with Henry in front of him. When they
reached the car, the defendant held Officer Spikes
in front of him, and ordered Adams to drop the
rifle. The pair then took the rifle and drove away.
On appeal, the defendant claimed that it was
reversible error for the judge not to instruct the
jury that they might "acquit him of the crime of
armed robbery charged in the indictment, and
convict him of an assault with a deadly weapon
upon Adams." The court said that if the circumstances disclosed an inference that the rifle was
taken without felonious intent, "it would have
been the duty of the judge to submit to the jury
the lesser and included offense of assault."
Robbery, said the court, is the "taking, with
intent to steal, of the personal property of another,
from his person or in his presence, without his
consent or against his will, by violence or intimidation." The felonious intent to appropriate the goods
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taken can be met by "showing an intent to deprive
the owner of his property permanently." The
court held that even if the rifle was taken for a
temporary use, the subsequent handling of it
amounting to "reckless exposure to loss" is
"consistent only with an intent permanently to
deprive the owner of his property."
The court concluded that the defendant's
actions in leaving the rifle against a pole "under
circumstances which render[ed] it unlikely that the
owner would ever recover his property and which
disclose[s] the taker's total indifference to his
rights" amounted to an intent to steal. Therefore,
the trial court properly restricted the jury in
returning a verdict of either guilty or not guilty of
the crime charged in the indictment.
Determining Indigency In Criminal CasesState v. Anaya, 417 P.2d 58 (N.M. 1966). The
Supreme Court of New Mexico, in remanding a
conviction for a narcotics violation to the trial
court for a finding of whether defendant had a
right to a court appointed counsel, held that an
undefined interest in property and employment
prior to arrest were not sufficient in themselves to
deny defendant this right.
At the trial it was determined that defendant had
purchased a trailer worth $7000 and presently
owed $2800 on it. He also had a car worth $1500,
with a $650 unpaid balance. Prior to his arrest,
defendant was employed at $4.85 per hour. Upon
these facts the trial court determined that defendant had enough property and was sufficiently
solvent to borrow money to hire a lawyer.
The court held that the finding of the trial court
was based upon an inadequate determination of the
facts. It stated that "the fact that defendant had
an undefined interest in three items of property
and the fact that he was employed prior to his
arrest is insufficient to determine the question of
defendant's financial responsibility". The court
noted that the trial court should have inquired
into the matter of whether defendant's interest
could be used as security to borrow money, whereupon he would be required to show that he tried
to borrow money and could not. However, the
court stated that borrowing ability is only one
aspect of determining the basic question of whether
the defendant has the financial means to employ
counsel. The court further stated that although
"the burden of proceeding rests first on the
defendant" to make a reasonable showing of
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indigency, once this is done, sufficient questioning
is required to enable the court to make its own
determination.
The Bookmaker and His Telephone-Sakol v.
Public Utilities Commission, 418 P.2d 265 (Cal.
1966). The issue before the court here was the
question of the constitutionality of a Public
Utilities Commission rule requiring the summary
termination of telephone service upon reasonable
cause to believe that petitioner's telephone was
being used for unlawful activities. It was held that
when the reasonable cause is based solely upon a
written notice from a law enforcement official
that the telephone is being used for such purposes,
due process has been violated since there is no
review of bare allegations prior to termination of
service.
In this case, petitioner's telephone service was
terminated by the telephone company pursuant to
a notice from the Chief of Police that he had
reasonable cause to believe that the telephone was
being used in connection with bookmaking
activities. Petitioner thereafter claimed that his
business (a telephone club supplying racing tips)
was ruined because of the action and that he was
therefore deprived of his property without due
process of law. The court stated that "there is no
rule of universal application concerning the right
of an individual to present his views at a hearing
prior to the institution of action affecting his
substantial rights." Therefore the court examined
the details of the case since "what is due process
depends on circumstances and varies with the
subject matter and necessities of the situation."
The court agreed with the state that notification
prior to termination would frustrate the policing
of certain illegal activities but it also noted that
the private rights of the individual must be taken
into consideration. The termination of telephone
service may deprive the subscriber of the monetary value of his economic venture and of an
essential means of communication, thus impairing
his right of free speech. The court further stated
that had the police desired to search the premises
occupied by petitioner and seize his property, they
would have had to satisfy the reasonable cause
requirement before obtaining a warrant.
The court could not find any "justification for
applying standards of due process substantially
less exacting than those pertaining to searches."
Thus, held the court, the decision of the Commis-
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sion "does not conform to the due process requirements of the state and Federal Constitutions in
that it provides no review of the bare allegations
of the police prior to the termination of service."
The court further held, however, that the telepone company could not be sued for damages since
"it would be manifestly unfair to impose civil
liability upon a private person (or other entity)
for doing that which the law [presumptively
valid] requires."
Search By Landlord Consent-United States v.
Botsch, 364 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1966). Defendant was
convicted of thirteen counts of using the mails to
defraud by using the name and credit of another to
obtain merchandise. During the trial the defendant
moved that certain evidence obtained as a consequence of a search without a warrant on November
6 (subsequent searches were based on information
obtained during the November 6 search) be excluded.
The November 6 search arose upon the complaint of one Locasio to postal officials about
purchases made by the defendant under the name
and credit of Locasio's company. Postal inspector
Daly went to the address to which the merchandise
was being shipped and found a shack which the
defendant had been leasing from one Stein. Stein,
in addition tq leasing the premises, had agreed to
receive the merchandise, pay the freight out of
money given him by the defendant, and place the
merchandise in the shack to which the defendant
had given Stein the keys.
When Daly questioned Stein about the shack,
and about the operations of the defendant, Stein
became concerned over the possibility that the
premises were being used for illegal purposes and
that by his actions he would be considered an
accomplice to them. Stein asked Daly if he wished
to look inside, and permitted Daly to look through
a window and then admitted him to the shack.
Inside, Daly observed boxes with the names of the
shippers, and along with information obtained
from Dun &.Bradstreet, obtained two search
warrants on November 8.
The defendant contended that if the November
6 search was unreasonable, the November 8
warrants were invalid and the indictment should
be dismissed. The government admitted that it
could not separate the tainted from the untainted
evidence.
:,
The court of appeals, in a 2-1 decision, affirmed

the conviction holding that the November 6 search
was not unreasonable. The majority based its
decision on the right of Stein to cooperate and
exculpate himself from the acts which were objectively facilitating a fraud or theft. The court used
this active, though innocent, participation and the
blanket permission to enter the shack granted to
Stein, to distinguish this case from cases involving
the simple landlord-tenant or innkeeper-guest
relationship, which would be insufficient to make
this kind of consent search valid.
Waiver of Right to Advice of Counsel During
Interrogation-Cox v. State, 405 S.W. 2d 937
(Ark. 1966). The accused, a gas station attendant,
was charged with the rape of a nineteen-year-old
girl. The evidence showed that the prosecutrix
had driven into the gas station and asked to have
her brakes fixed. The accused then drove to a
back road under the pretense of testing the brakes
and had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix.
After the incident was reported the accused was
taken into custody and questioned by the deputy
prosecuting attorney and two police officers. The
officers testified that they informed the accused of
his constitutional right to an attorney, but that
he said he didn't need any. Before trial the accused
underwent a mental examination in which it was
found that he was a mild mental defective with an
I.Q. of about 70 but was not a psychotic. The
jury found him guilty of assault with intent to
rape.
The issue on appeal was whether the accused was
capable of "intelligently and knowingly" waiving
his right to counsel under Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478 (1964). The appellate court felt that,
under the circumstances presented, the accused
understood the situation and the questions he was
called upon to answer. The mental ability of the
person questioned must be considered in light of
the other facts, said the court, which here included
the trial judge's determination that the accused
could understand the questions presented, the
accused's ability to support a family, and his
testimony at the trial.
Compulsory Production of Tape Recordings
Elicited From an Accused-United States v.
Soplier, 362 F.2d 523 (7th Cir. 1966). Defendants,
the mayor and commissioners of Streeter, Illinois,
were arrested and convicted of violation of the
Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C.A., §1951, for extorting, and
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conspiring to extort, money from employees of a
power equipment company which was bidding on a
city contract.
On appeal, the defense contended, inter alia,
that the prosecution was required, under the
Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C.A., §3500, to produce certain
tape recordings taken from a hidden recording
device carried by one of the bribery victims.
Section 3500 requires, on motion of the defendant,
the production by the prosecution of any statement
of a witness relating to the subject matter to which
he testified. "Statement" is defined as "either a
written statement or a stenographic, mechanical,
electrical or other recording . . ., which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement
made by some witness to an agent of the government and recorded contemporaneously with the
making of such oral statement." The court held,
however, that the recording in this case was not a
statement required to be produced under section
3500, since the latter is necessarily a present
statement of a past occurrence, where here, the
tape recording was of a contemporaneous occurrence.
Police Officers Liability For False ArrestHerschel v. Dyra, 365 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1966). The
plaintiff was arrested by the defendant police
officer for violation of a City of Chicago antilitter ordinance regulating the distribution of handbills on public ways. Thereafter the plaintiff
brought an action under the Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the defendant officer,
while acting under the color of law, had deprived
the plaintiff of his constitutional rights in that at
the time of the arrest there were existent opinions
of the corporation counsel of the City of Chicago
informing the police that the ordinance did not
apply to pamphlets expressing purely social,
religious or economic views. The pamphlets that
the plaintiff had been distributing were of a
religious nature. The District Court dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.
The Court of Appeals reversed, relying upon the
holding in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, that
§1983 should be read against the background of
tort liability that makes a man responsible for the
natural consequences of his actions, and held that
the complaint alleged more than a simple innocent
false arrest. One judge dissented, saying that
Monroe v. Pape should not be extended to apply to
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a police officer's honest misunderstanding of the
law where no malice or intent to deprive a plantiff
of any of his civil rights has been alleged.
Successive Contempt Sentences And Double
Jeopardy-United States ex rel. Ushkowitz v.
McCloskey, 359 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1966). On three
separate occasions the relators were sentenced to a
term of imprisonment and a fine for refusing to
answer the same question directed to them before a
New York grand jury after having been granted
immunity from prosecution. After the third
sentence, and having exhausted their state remedies, the relators applied for a writ of habeas corpus
in a federal district court contending that the
three separate prosecutions constituted double
jeopardy in violation of the fifth amendment. The
petition was dismissed but a certificate of probable
cause was granted.
The Court of Appeals held that the three
prosecutions did not constitute double jeopardy
because each refusal to answer was a separate and
distinct offense, separated by appreciable periods
of time including prison terms imposed to induce a
change in the conduct of the three relators.
Judge May Not Assume Prosecutor's RoleFigueroa Ruiz v. Delgado, 359 F.2d 718 (1st Cir.
1966). The petitioner applied for a writ of habeas
corpus after being convicted of two misdemeanors
in a District Court of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico and after exhausting his local remedies. Appealing the dismissal of the petition, he
contended that the procedure in the Commonwealth of providing no prosecutors in the District
Court, but having the judge serve in both the
judicial and prosecutorial roles, denied him due
process of law.
The Court of Appeals, remanding with instructions to grant the writ, held that a court procedure
by which the judge introduces evidence and crossexamines on behalf of the government denies the
accused due process of law because it lacks the
"appearance of justice" and could possibly upset
the balance between the government and the
accused.
No Liability For Injury During Prevention Of A
Felony-Yingst v. Pratt, 220 N.E. 2d 276 (Ind.
1966). Plaintiff, Pratt, was shot in a tavern when
the tavern owner struggled with a robber in an
attempt to stop the robbery. The' tavern owner
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died and was represented by the administrator of redeeming social value. The court dismissed statements suggesting that the publications were for
his estate, Yingst.
Plaintiff alleged at the trial that as a business serious artists or for sunbathers as being spurious
invitee of defendant's decedent he was owed a claims, finding that the magazines were designed
duty of care which was breached when defendant's solely to appeal to the prurient interests of adolesdecedent grabbed the robber's gun hand attempt- cent and adult males.
The court stated that it was a more difficult
ing to prevent the robbery. During the ensuing
struggle, several shots were fired from the gun, one problem to determine whether such publications
did in fact appeal to a prurient interest and whether
of which hit, plaintiff.
Plaintiff claimed, and his claim was upheld in the the material conformed to contemporary comtrial court, that the reckless action of defendant's munity standards. It thus attempted to define in
decedent was the proximate cause of his injuries. greater detail the principles which should guide
Defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the law enforcement officials in determining whether
photographic material is obscene.
close of the evidence was denied.
The court said that not all photographs of nude
On appeal from the order denying this motion
defendant contended that the verdict of the jury woman are obscene, "even if the focus is on the
was contrary to the weight of the evidence and breast or pubic area ...or [even if] the models are
contrary to law. In reversing and instructing the posed in an unusual or ugly position." Some of the
trial court to hold for defendant, the Appellate factors which the court held may render a photoCourt of Indiana held that the finding of the jury graph obscene are "(1) that the model is on a bed
was indeed contrary to the notion of justification or a bed is a part of the picture, (2) that the woman
is in an enticing or lewd position, (3) that the pubic
found in the law of torts.
Relying on such authorities as Prosser, Bohen, area is bare (and overaccentuated by the pose or
and Beale, the court found that in certain transac- clothing arrangement), (4) that properties are
tions otherwise actionable the actor is sometimes used in such a way as to heighten prurient interest
justified and thus not vulnerable to liability. The ...[and] (5) that any type of sexual activity is
prevention of a dangerous felony is one of these suggested or depicted.
The court further stated that even though the
justifiable actions. In such a situation the actor is
in fact commanded by public policy to use force to dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
prevent the felony. To that end the victim of a must be considered, a few obscene photographs
crime as dangerous as brmed robbery, during the might give a prurient appeal to the whole magacourse of such criminal act, is justified and privi- zine.
leged to use force in return.
Inaudible Tapes Inadmissible-Duggan v.
These authoritative maxims, while absolving the
actor from liability to the felon, however, did not State, 189 So. 2d 890 (Fla. App. 1966). The deexplicitly delineate the duty he owed to innocent fendant, a police officer, was convicted of accepting
by-standers. The court thus had to add to the bribes. Tape recordings were made of a conversageneral rule the finding that the actor owed no tion between the defendant and the person allegal duty to use greater care for the protection of legedly offering the bribes, but some portions of
others than he, in the emergency, had seen fit to the recordings were inaudible.
A court reporter, not present when the recorduse to protect himself.
ings were made, prepared written transcripts of the
Obscenity-Utited States v. 25,000 Magazines, recordings. The reporter prepared an initial series
254 F. Supp. 1014 (D.C. 1966). The government
of transcripts by listening to a tape recorder. A
sought a forfeiture of magazines imported from second series was then prepared by using a tape
recorder and a set of earphones. There were some
Denmark on the grounds of obscenity. The district
court, setting up criteria by which the obscenity of variations between the two series of manuscripts
photographic material could be determined, held because of the reporter's different interpretation of
the inaudible parts of the conversation when
only some of the magazines to be obscene.
The court used the basic guidelines for deter- listening to it through earphones.
in his noral argument to the jury, the prosecutor
mining obscenity set forth in Roth v. United States.
It was first concluded that the magazines had no stated that the tape recording of the conversation
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between the alleged briber and the defendant was
"really the critical thing in this matter" because it
covered the period of time when the payoff was
made. This was the tape that contained the inaudible remarks. The second series of transcripts
were admitted as evidence over the defendant's
objection. The jurors were permitted to take their
copies of the transcripts into the jury room, but
neither the tapes nor any means for playing them
were furnished. The defendant also objected to
this procedure.
The District Court of Appeal of Florida reversed
the conviction holding that the transcripts of the
tape recordings were inadmissible as evidence because the transcripts furnished to the jury violated
the best evidence rule, since the tape recordings
were themselves the best evidence; the court reporter was not present when the recordings were
made, thus his transcripts were inadmissible under
the hearsay rule; and the juror's use of the transcripts violated the rules against undue repetition
and improper emphasis of evidence.
The appellate court stressed the fact that the
transcript of the inaudible parts of the tape could
"under no recognizable theory" be received as
evidence because the court reporter was not present when the conversation took place nor when the
tapes were made. Therefore he could not testify
as one who had witnessed the events which were
stated in the transcript, "nor could he testify as an
expert witness who is professionally skilled in the
understanding of indistinguishable taped conversations. Since the conversation recited in that particular transcript pertained to the most critical
issue in the prosecution's case against the [defendant] ...

the highly prejudicial effect of ad-

mitting the said transcript in evidence is obvious."
Invasion of Privacy-Hauiu v. State, 189 So. 2d
230 (Fla. App. 1966). The defendant was convicted of practicing medicine without a license. The
proof showed that defendant had made an internal
pelvic examination of a patient who was an employee of a private detective hired to investigate
the defendant by the State Board of Medical
Examiners. The patient carried a radio transmitter
in her purse and the entire conversation between
the defendant and the patient was heard by the
detective on a radio receiver. At the trial, the
detective related the conversation.
On appeal the defendant contended that the trial
court. erred in not suppressing the detective's
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testimony concerning defendant's conversation
with the patient. In reversing the conviction the
District Court of Appeals of Florida held that the
use of such "surreptitiously obtained information"
violated the defendant's right of privacy guaranteed by the fourth amendment. The court cited
Silverman v. U.S., 365 U.S. 505, in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that "a
federal officer may [not] without warrant and
without consent physically entrench into a man's
office or home, there secretly observe or listen, and
relate at the man's subsequent criminal trial what
was seen or heard." In this case, the detective had
entered the defendant's premises through stealth,
fraud, and deceit, said the court, and the secreting
of the transmitting device in order that the detective might hear the conversation was therefore a
trespass violative of the defendant's privacy.
Prosecution Suppression of Evidence-People
v. Fein, 219 N.E. 2d 274 (N.Y. 1966). The defendant was convicted of second degree murder based
mainly upon the testimony of the prosecution's key
witness-a prostitute and girlfriend of the defendant. The prostitute testified that the defendant
admitted killing the deceased and that she had
seen the deceased's body in a trunk in the defendant's apartment. She and two of her friends, who
corroborated her story, aided the defendant in disposing of the body.
The prostitute had recafited her story before the
trial, but then withdrew her recantation and
affirmed her original story. Another of the prosecution's witnesses had told investigators a story
which differed from that of the prostitute and, if
true, might possibly have cast doubt upon the
prostitute's credibility and perhaps implicated
her, or someone she was trying to protect, as the
real murderer. These facts were known to the court
and to the defense, but were not brought to the
jury's attention during the trial.
At the post-trial hearing, the prostitute again
recanted her original story when confronted by the
prosecution's witness whose story differed from
hers. Two days later the prostitute again withdrew
her recantation and affirmed her original story.
On appeal the defendant contended that the
facts revealed at the post-trial hearing established
the prosecution's failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence and thus denied the defendant
the benefit of a fair trial. In affirming the conviction the New York Court of Appeals held that a
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prosecutor must have some discretion in determining which evidence to turn over to the defense. The
prosecutor must be allowed to judge, in light of all
the facts of the case, the value of evidence to the
defense in terms of its potential impact on the
jury. Quoting Judge Hastie, the court said, "There
are many situations in which a prosecutor can
fairly keep to himself his knowledge of available
testimony which he views as mistaken or false. But
there are other circumstances in which a prosecutor should know that even testimony which he
honestly disbelieves is of a type which in all
probability would make it very persuasive to a fairminded jury." U.S. ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221
F. 2d 763, 769 (1955). (Emphasis added.) The evidence which the prosecution failed to disclose to the
jury in this case, the court concluded, would not
have affected the jury's determination of the case.
Custody Requirement of Miranda LimitedDuffy v. State, 221 A. 2d 653 (Md. 1966). Defendant
was convicted in the Criminal Court of Baltimore
for carrying a deadly weapon, attempted robbery,
and assault, for his participation in a gang attack
on a robbery victim. On appeal he contended that
the testimony of the arresting policeman as to his
oral admission of guilt made after being awakened
and asked, "Is this the knife you used in the fight?"
should have been held inadmissible because he was
not apprised of his constitutional rights before
answering.
The Maryland Court of Appeals rejected this
contention, holding that the exclusionary principles enunciated in Escobedo and Miranda are not
applicable to a confession gleaned from a suspect
who is merely accosted by the police, but deal instead with the safeguards that must be provided
an accused who is in police custody. The court in a
strict interpretation of the Miranda definition of
"custodial interrogation," found that since defendant had neither been taken into custody at the
time of the question, nor deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way, the warning rule was
inapplicable.
Second Search Upheld-Baca v. People, 418 P.
2d 182 (Colo. 1966). Defendant was convicted in
the District Court of possession of narcotic drugs.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Colorado, he
contended that the search of his person at the
police station (after he was taken into custody for
being drunk in a public place and indecent expo-

sure) was so remote from the place of arrest that it
was unreasonable and that the evidence gained
thereby should have been excluded.
The court recognized the rule that an arrest
cannot be used as a pretext to search for evidence,
but held that the search in the instant case was not
prohibited. Instead it found that a second search
of defendant's person for concealed weapons, improving on the earlier desultory "frisking," was a
reasonable and indeed integral part of efficient
police procedure. The court said that it was reductio ad absurdum to urge that a prisoner who
may be armed, and thus able to kill or wound his
jailers, or who may have on his person other evidence of the crime for which he was taken into
custody, cannot be searched a second time, and a
search in a police station immediately following an
arrest was held to be not too remote in time or
place.
Polygraph Tests-People v. Potts, 220 N.E. 2d
251 (fll. App. 1966). Defendant was convicted of
rape in the Circuit Court and was sentenced to
three years. On a second count, based on the Habitual Criminal Act, he was sentenced to life imprisonment.
On appeal to the appellate court, defendant
contended that the admission into evidence of
polygraph tests (pursuant to a stipulation of defendant and the prosecution that the results of
these tests would be admissible) was prejudicial
error requiring reversal where the report was admitted without inquiry as to the qualifications of
the operator of the polygraph machine.
The appellate court reviewed previous cases in
which the results of polygraph tests were admitted
by stipulation of the parties and came to the con'
clusion that the admission of such evidence was
proper only if inquiry was made into the qualifications of the operator of the polygraph machine and
the conditions under which the test was administered. In reversing, the court refused to become
embroiled in the dispute among experts as to the
scientific reliability of the polygraph, but held
only that the expertise of the operator and interpreter had a substantial bearing on the
question of reliability.
Bail-Jumping And Defendant'S Presence At
Post-Trial Proceedings-Peoplev. Cox, 220 N.E:
2d 10 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966). Defendant was indicted,
and subsequently convicted, for unlawfully faling
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to appear at the hearing on a motion for new trial
in violation of his trial bail bond and post-trial personal recognizance. The conditions in the bail bond
were that the defendant "shall personally appear
[On the opening day of the trial]... and thereafter
as ordered by the court until discharged... and
shall submit himself to the orders and processes of
the court ......
On appeal, defendant contended that since the
indictment alleged only his absence from the hearing, it was insufficient to state an offense, and the
conviction and sentence thereunder must be reversed.
In reversing the conviction, the Illinois appellate
court held that unless the court had ordered the
defendant to be present, absence from a hearing on
a motion for new trial was not a violation of
the conditions of a bail bond or a personal recognizance.
The court reasoned that if the defendant has no
constitutional right to be present at the argument
on a motion for new trial [see Bonardo v. People,
182 111. 411, 55 N.E. 519 (1899)], then certainly the
defendant may waive his appearance. The court
also found that previous cases had held that the
absence of the defendant from the hearing on
motions did not vitiate any action taken at the
hearing. In light of these principles, the court concluded that since the trial court had not ordered
the defendant to appear at the hearing, his absence
from the hearing was not a violation of the conditions of the bail bond or the personal recognizance, but merely a voluntary absence amounting
to a waiver of his right to be present.
Curfew Ordinances and Parental Responsibility-City of Westlake v. Ruggiero, 220 N.E. 2d
126 (Ohio App. 1966). Defendant was convicted of
violating a municipal curfew ordinance forbidding
a parent
"of any child between the ages of twelve (12)
years and sixteen (16) years to allow such child
to be upon the streets or sidewalks between the
hours of 11:00 o'clock p.m. and 6:00 o'clock
a.m., unless accompanied by his parent... or
unless such child has a legitimate excuse
therefor."
On appeal, the defendant contended that the
ordinance was unconstitutional since (1) it unduly
restricted the personal freedoms of the child and
(2) it made the parent absolutely liable for the
conduct of his child.
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Although the opinion does not indicate that the
defendant claimed the decision was against the
manifest weight of the evidence, that was the
ground upon which the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and discharged the defendant. The court reached this conclusion by interpreting the word "allow," as used in the ordinance,
to mean "permit or neglect to restrain or prevent.
It requires actual or constructive knowledge on the
part of the parent .... " Since the undisputed evidence indicated the defendant neither knew nor
had reason to know his son was violating the curfew, the conviction was reversed and the defendant discharged.
By interpreting "allow" in this manner the
court also rebutted the second claim to unconstitutionality.
The court disposed of the defendant's first claim
of unconstitutionality (that the ordinance was an
undue restriction of personal freedom) by holding
that the ordinance was a reasonable exercise of the
police power, designed to protect the peace and
good morals of the community by "reducing the
incidence of juvenile criminal activity."
Comment: The Court's discussion of the constitutionality of the ordinance is dictum, since the
conviction was reversed on evidentiary grounds.
In addition, upon a careful consideration of the
ordinance, one is led to the conclusion that it is
unconstitutional.
The portion of the ordinance set out above subjects a child between the ages of twelve and sixteen
to criminal prosecution if he is found on the
streets or sidewalks of the municipality between
the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. unless he is
accompanied by his parent or unless he has "a
legitimate excuse therefor." This language is very
similar to the words "lawful purpose" which were
held to be too general and too vague to afford, to
the ordinary person, notice of what acts the ordinance proscribed. People v. Munoz, 9 N.Y. 2d 51,
172 N.E. 2d 535 (1961). Since there is no moral
guilt attached to being on the street after 11:00
p.m., the need to properly inform children as to
what acts they should avoid is all the more necessary.
The court, by interpreting "allow" to mean
knowing acquiescence, did not escape this problem,
since the parent may know he is permitting his
child to be "on the street" after curfew time, but he
may not know the child's excuse is not legitimate.
That the presumption underlying the ordinance
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is reasonable (that children on the streets of the
city after a certain hour in the evening are bent on
mischief), as well as rational, Barrett v. United
States, 322 F. 2d 292 (5th Cir. 1963), is doubtful.
The legislature expressed this doubt by excluding
children with legitimate excuses from the ambit of
the ordinance. Then, in effect, the ordinance says
act X" is bad unless it is good, and places the
burden on the accused to show the act is good.
Clearly, such an ordinance deprives one of the
presumption of innocence. The proscription adopts
the inquisitional rather than the accusatorial approach, thus placing the burden on the defendant
to prove his innocence before the prosecution has
carried out its burden to show him guilty.
Aside from the constitutional issue, the ordinance may have a grave repercussion upon the
family relationship. It penalizes the parent for an
error in judgment. A parent may, in good faith,
consider an excuse to be "legitimate," and subsequently the excuse may be held not to be legitimate
by the court. Then the child, relying upon his
father's permission, can be penalized by the court.
This is certainly not going to foster parental respect. In addition, the child is burdened with a
criminal record for the rest of his life.
The ordinance also suffers from poor draftsmanship. The portion of the ordinance set out above is
followed by a section which forbids similar actions
on the part of a child between the ages of sixteen
and eighteen between the hours of 12:00 midnight
and 6:00 a.m. Thus, a child sixteen and his parent
might be subjected to penalty under two different
sections of the ordinance.
On the whole, it seems that the gratuitous
dictum set out in the court's opinion conferred no
benefits to the public, the bar, or the child.
Appointed Counsel and the Frivolous AppealJohnson v. United States, 360 F. 2d 844 (D.C. Cir.
1966). Defendant, an indigent, was convicted of
an undisclosed criminal offense. Subsequently, he
told his attorney, whom the District Court had
appointed to act as an advocate on his behalf, that
he wished to appeal in forma pauperis. The attorney, apparently feeling that there were no
grounds for an appeal, moved the Court of Appeals for leave to withdraw from the case, contending that the appeal was frivolous and lacked
merit.
In a per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion on the ground that it could not

be determined whether the appeal was frivolous,
since counsel had not filed a fully documented
memorandum supporting his contention.
The court stated that Ellis v. United States, 365
U.S. 674 (1958), held appointed counsel's motion
to withdraw could be granted only if the court was
satisfied that counsel had conscientiously investigated the possible grounds for appeal, and if the
court agreed that the appeal was frivolous. Pursuant to the duty Ellis had cast on it, the court
thereafter issued a document to be given to all
appointed counsel which stipulated that, if appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw because
an appeal was frivolous and without merit, he must
le a supporting memorandum analyzing the
case's legal aspects and citing any relevant holdings. Statement to be Handed by the Clerk to
Appointed Counsel (Dec. 13, 1963). Since the
petitioner had not filed the memorandum, the
court could not determine whether he had diligently investigated, nor whether the appeal was,
in its opinion, frivolous.
Judge Burger concurred, but did not base his
the memorandum.
decision on the failure to file
He began by noting that it was the usual practice of
the court, when it granted such motions, not to
appoint new counsel, but to tell the defendant that
if he wishes to continue his appeal he will have to
do so pro se. This, Judge Burger says, is unrealistic;
no one can possibly act as an advocate for himself
in an appellate proceeding, unless he has had legal
training. An attorney is not the "mouthpiece" of
his client, but a professional advocate whose function in an appellate proceeding, even when he feels
the appeal is "hopeless," consists of "making sure
that the reviewing court understands all the salient
facts and all the relevant legal authorities." He
must call the court's attention to "the critical
issues and bring to the court all the facts and law
and [be] prepared to respond to questions...,
under our adversary system an appellate court
can not function efficiently without lawyers ...."
Judge Burger commented on the great number
of motions to withdraw from frivolous claims and
served notice that he would deny all applications
by counsel to withdraw from a "hopeless" case,
since an attorney's professional assistance is
essential, both to the appellant and to the court.
In summary, Judge Burger said:
"I do not suggest we compel any lawyer, by
judicial order, to act contrary to conscience;
rather, I urge lawyers to approach the de-
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cision to withdraw in light of the purposes of
appellate review, the need for assistance of
professional advocates, and the role counsel
should perform, conscious that he serves well
his client, his profession, and the court when
he has made certain the final judicial action is
based on complete and accurate knowledge of
the record and the law."
Comment: An appeal informa pauperismust be
made in good faith, 28 U.S.C. §1916(a), which has
been interpreted to mean seeking review of any
issue not plainly frivolous, Coppage v. United
States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962). The legislature enacted
Section 1915(a) as an advance screening device,
since informa pauperisproceedingshave no built-in
pecuniary brake to restrain frivolous appellants.
If the term "hopeless" is used in the concurring
opinion to indicate that the advocate should bring
to the court's attention any issue upon which a
factual or legal argument could conceivably be
made in favor of the defendant's cause, then this
borders on the frivolous but it is not plainly so,
thus it satisfies the Coppage test.
This verbiage aside, the concurring opinion illustrates the questionable conduct of a large number
of the bar, who have utilized an ex parteproceeding
(which, by its nature, has few enough legal and
procedural safeguards to insure that the entire
matter is given a fair hearing) to their own selfinterest, and in derogation of the best interests of
those they have been appointed to protect. Every
defense attorney should read Judge Burger's
opinion, and then read it again.
Optional Tests of Insanity-State v. Shoffner,
143 N.W. 2d 458 (Wis. 1966). The defendant was
convicted of burglary, arson, and armed robbery.
At the trial he had pleaded not guilty by reason of
insanity and the trial judge had instructed the
jury under the M'Naghten test as required in Wisconsin (State v. Esser, 115 N.W. 2d 515).
The defendant had requested the use of one
of four alternative tests including the A.L.I.
formulation.
The Wisconsin Supreme court, in reversing
Shoffner's conviction, upheld the Esser test, requiring that the insanity defense be based on
"capacity to understand the nature and quality of
the act and capacity to distinguish between right
and wrong as to it," as the only test the defendant
is entitled to as a matter of right. The court felt
that the Esser rule when coupled with a statute
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placing the burden of proving sanity beyond a
reasonable doubt on the prosecution did not produce unjust results and should not be changed.
However, the court decided Shoffner or any
future defendant raising an insanity defense may
now, at his option, elect to be tried under the more
liberal American Law Institute definition, providing that he is willing to assume the burden of proof
on the issue of insanity.
Additionally, the court stated that it would not
be improper, indeed it would be advisable, to
instruct the jury that the effect of a "not guilty by
reason of insanity" verdict would result in the
commitment of the defendant to a mental hospital,
although, ordinarily, "a jury is not to be informed
of the effect of its answers upon the rights or liabilities of the parties."
Warning Must Precede Consent to SearchUnited States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268 (D.C.
1966). This case involved a motion to suppress
21 twenty dollar bills seized by the FBI in a search
of the defendant's hotel room. The original motion
was denied, but thereafter the trial judge granted a
new trial and suppressed the evidence.
The defendant was suspected of bank robbery
and was questioned by the FBI in the lobby of his
hotel. He then allowed the agents to search his
room without a warrant, and the money was
found during that search.
The issue involved here is whether a voluntary
consent to a warrantless search of a defendant's
premises, without proof in the record of the defendant's knowledge of his right to resist such a
search, can operate as a waiver of defendant's
constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The prosecution maintained
that the protection was waived by voluntarily
allowing the agents to search the room. However,
the court, in granting the motion to suppress, said
that "... rights given by the constitution are too
fundamental and too precious for waiver lightly
to be found."
The court reiterated the rule laid down in
Johnso a. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), that a
waiver of a defendant's constitutional rights can
only be found where there is "an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege." To
establish such a waiver, the prosecution must
prove that the consent was both intelligent and
voluntary. The court went on to say that "obvi-

